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THE 12(i)'ed MONSTER: ADMINISTRATION
OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF
1934 BY THE FEDERAL BANK
REGULATORY AGENCIES
Michael P. Malloy*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Since 1934, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)'
* Professor of Law and Director of Graduate Studies, Fordham University School of
Law. B.A., Georgetown University, 1973; J.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1976; Ph.D., Georgetown University, 1983. This article is based upon a report prepared by the author for the
Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS), and portions of the Article also
draw upon drafts of a forthcoming supplement to M.P. MALLOY, THE CORPORATE LAW OF
BANKS (2 vols. 1988), to be published by Little, Brown and Co. in mid-1991. The view§ expressed in this Article are those of the author and should not be attributed to the ACUS. The
author wishes to thank ACUS and its staff, particularly ACUS Chairman Marshall J. Breger,
Mr. Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Research Director, and Mr. Brian C. Murphy, Office of the Chairman, for their encouragement of the research study. The author also wishes to acknowledge
the suggestions and comments of the members of the ACUS Special Committee on Financial
Services made during the course of the Committee's consideration of the author's report on the
research study. Finally, the author acknowledges the contributions of his research assistants,
Mr. David Adler and Ms. Pamela Edwards, Fordham University School of Law Class of 1991.
1. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881, 885 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78d(a) (1988)) (establishing the SEC) All subsequent citations to the United States
Code are to the current text, as supplemented, unless otherwise indicated. For a discussion of
the statutory authority of the SEC, see 1 L. Loss & J. SELIGMAN, SEcuRITIES REGULATION
285-307 (3d ed. 1989). See also L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 35-38

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1990

1

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [1990], Art. 1

- HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19:269

has administered the scheme of federal statutes concerned with the
regulation of the issuance of, and trading in, securities.' One particular class of issuers of securities that has received relatively favored
treatment under this-regulatory scheme has been the depository institutions.' However, since 1964, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC),4 the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
(2d ed. 1988) (giving a brief description of the seven statutes that the SEC administers).
2. These statutes include the: (i) Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a-77aa
(Vest 1981 & Supp. 1990); (ii) Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a-781l
(West 1981 & Supp. 1990); (iii) Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C.A.
§§ 79-79z-6 (West 1981 & Supp. 1990); (iv) Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C.A.
§§ 77aaa-77bbbb (West 1981 & Supp. 1990); (v) Investment Company Act of 1940, 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64 (West 1981 & Supp. 1990); and (vi) Investment Advisers Act of
1940, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (West 1981 & Supp. 1990).
For a discussion of the scope and purposes of these statutes, see L. Loss & J. SEUGMAN,
supra note 1, at 226-69. See also L. Loss, supra note 1, at 36-38. On the two 1940 acts in
particular, the definitive work is T. FRANKEL, REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS (4 vols.
1978-80 & Supp. 1990).
3. For a discussion of the favored treatment of depository institutions under the 1933
Securities Act and 1934 Securities Exchange Act, see infra notes 40-42 and accompanying
text. For purposes of this study, the term "depository institution" is taken to mean commercial
banks, savings and loan associations and, savings banks (now collectively known in federal law
as "savings associations"). In some contexts, the term "depository institution" is taken to refer
to a broader classification of financial intermediaries consisting of commercial banks, savings
and loan associations (S&Ls) and savings banks, and credit unions. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C.
§ 461(b)(1) (1988) (defining "depository institution" for purposes of the Federal Reserve Act
(FRA)). See generally 1 M.P. MALLOY. THE CORPORATE LAW OF BANKS 5-8 (1988 & Supp.
1991) (discussing "depository institution" as a technical term of art). Under the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 [hereinafter FIRREA], Pub. L.
No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified at scattered sections of titles 12 and 15 U.S.C.), the term
has been given a narrower meaning, to include only commercial banks and S&Ls and savings
banks. See FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 204(c)(1), 103 Stat. 183, 191 (1989) (codified at
12 U.S.C.A. § 1813(c) (West 1989)) (defining "depository institution" for purposes of Federal
Deposit Insurance Act [hereinafter FDIA]); see also 1 M.P. MALLOY, supra at 7-8 (Supp.
1991) (discussing the meaning and statutory scope of the term "depository institution" under
FIRREA).
For purposes of federal bank regulatory law, S&Ls and savings banks are now generically
referred to as "savings associations." See FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 204(b), 103 Stat.
183, 190-91 (1989) (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 1813(b) (West 1989)) (defining "savings association" for purposes of FDIA); id. § 301, 103 Stat. 183, 277 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 1462(4) (West 1989)) (defining "savings association" for purposes of Home Owners Loan
Act [hereinafter HOLA]); see also 1 M.P. MALLOY, supra, at 8 (Supp. 1991) (discussing the
meaning and statutory scope of the term "savings association" under FDIA and HOLA).
4. The Comptroller of the Currency is the federal official with chartering, examination,
and supervisory authority over national banks and banks operating in the District of Columbia.
See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1, 37 (1988) (defining the authority of the Comptroller under the National
Bank Act [hereinafter NBA] and the applicability of the NBA); 12 U.S.C. § 1813(q)(1)
(1988) (defining the authority of the Comptroller under the FDIA); see also infra note 19 and
accompanying text (discussing the authority of the Comptroller under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). See generally 1 M.P. MALLOY, supra note 3, at 28-40 (1988 & Supp.
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System (Fed),5 and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

(FDIC), 6 have had authority under section 12(i) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) 7 to administer certain provisions
1991) (discussing the role and authority of the Comptroller).
5. The Fed has examination and supervisory authority primarily over state-chartered
member banks. See 12 U.S.C. § 483 (1988) (defining the authority of the Fed under the
FRA); 12 U.S.C. § 1813(q)(2) (1988) (defining the authority of the Fed under the FDIA);
infra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing the authority of the Fed under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934). See generally 1 M.P. MALLOY, supra note 3, at 40-47 (1988 & Supp.
1991) (discussing the role and authority of the Fed). The Fed also has approval, examination
and supervisory authority over bank holding companies [hereinafter BHCs]. See 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1841-50 (1988) (describing the authority of the Fed under the Bank Holding Company
Act) [hereinafter BHCA]. However, the SEC, and not the Fed, exercises 1934 Act authority
with respect to BHCs. See L. Loss, supra note 1, at 417.
6. The FDIC has examination and supervisory authority primarily over state-chartered
nonmember banks, the deposits of which it insures. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811, 1814, 1821 (1988)
(outlining the authority of the FDIC under the FDIA and the applicability of the FDIA); 12
U.S.C. § 1813(q)(3) (1988) (discussing the FDIA and authority of the FDIC); see infra note
21 and accompanying text (discussing the authority of the FDIC under the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act). See generally 1 M.P. MALLOY, supra note 3, at 47-52 (1988 & Supp. 1991)
(discussing the role and authority of the FDIC). The FDIC also insures the deposits of savings
associations, and exercises some regulatory authority over them, in addition to that exercised
by the Office of Thrift Supervision [hereinafter OTS]. See 12 U.S.C. § 1814(a)(2) (1990)
(discussing insurance of savings association deposits); infra notes 10-11 and accompanying text
(discussing the role of the OTS).
7. 15 U.S.C.A. § 781(i) (West Supp. 1991). This section currently provides as follows:
In respect of any securities issued by banks and savings associations the deposits of which are insured in accordance with the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, the
powers, functions, and duties vested in the Commission to administer and enforce
this section and sections 78m, 78n(a), 78n(c), 78n(d), 78n(f), and 78p [sections 12,
13, 14(a), 14(c), 14(d), 14(0, and 16 of the 1934 Secturities Exchange Act], (1)
with respect to national banks and banks operating under the Code of Law for the
District of Columbia are vested in the Comptroller of the Currency, (2) with respect
to all other member banks of the Federal Reserve System are vested in the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, (3) with respect to all other insured
banks are vested in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and (4) with respect
to savings associations the accounts of which are insured by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation are vested in the Office of Thrift Supervision. The Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Office of Thrift Supervision shall
have the power to make such rules and regulations as may be necessary for the
execution of the functions vested in them as provided in this subsection. In carrying
out their responsibilities under this subsection, the agencies named in the first sentence of this subsection shall issue substantially similar regulations to regulations
and rules issued by the Commission under this section and sections 78m, 78n(a),
78
p unless they find that implementation of substan78n(c), 78n(d), 78n(f), and
respect to insured banks and insured institutions are
with
tially similar regulations
not necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for protection of investors, and
publish such findings, and the detailed reasons therefor, in the Federal Register.
Such regulations of the above-named agencies, or the reasons for failure to publish
such substantially similar regulations to those of the Commission, shall be published
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of the 1934 Act, subject to certain statutorily specified limitations. 8
Since 1974,1 the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB)I ° (and
since 1989 its successor, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS)"I)
has exercised identical 1934 Act authority over savings associations.
In light of current and past practices of these federal bank and
thrift regulatory agencies (the agencies) under their section 12(i) authority, there is serious concern whether they are adequately fulfilling their responsibilities under the section. There is also a related
concern whether the regulatory scheme established by the section is
still relevant in light of current market conditions. This Article attempts to assess these concerns and to make appropriate
recommendations.
This Article includes three segments: (1) a review and textual
analysis of the background and provisions of the statutory authority
of section 12(i) of the 1934 Act and the implementing regulations of
the bank regulatory agencies; 2 (2) an empirical analysis of the implementation of section 12(i) by these agencies;' 3 and, (3) an assessment of the performance of the regulatory agencies under the section
in the Federal Register within 120 days of October 28, 1974, and, thereafter, within
60 days of any changes made by the Commission in its relevant regulations and
rules.
Id.
8. See infra notes 18-32 and accompanying text (discussing the limitations on section
12(i) authority).
9. Act of Oct. 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 105(b), 88 Stat. 1500, 1503 (current
version at 15 U.S.C.A. § 781(i) (West Supp. 1991)).
10. The FHLBB was the chartering, examination and supervisory authority of federal
savings associations prior to its termination in 1989. See 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1988). It was
abolished by the FIRREA and replaced, for all purposes pertinent to this study, by the OTS.
See FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, §§ 301, 401(a)(2), 103 Stat. 183, 278-79, 354 (1989)
(codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 1462a (West Supp. 1991)) (establishing the OTS and abolishing
the FHLBB); infra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing the 1934 Securities Exchange
Act authority of the FHLBB/OTS). Its deposit insurance affiliate, the Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation [hereinafter FSLIC], was the primary federal regulator of statechartered S&Ls. 12 U.S.C. § 1726 (1988). The FSLIC also exercised approval, examination,
and supervisory authority over S&L holding companies [hereinafter SLHCs], see 12 U.S.C. §
1730a (1988) (S&L Holding Company Act), but neither the FHLBB nor the FSLIC had
authority over SLHCs under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. Cf. L. Loss, supra note 1, at
417 (discussing SEC authority over BHCs under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act).
11. The OTS was created by section 301 of the FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat.
183, 278-79 (1989) (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 1462a (West Supp. 1991)). The Director of the
OTS (DOTS) is the primary federal regulator of savings associations and SLHCs. See 12
U.S.C.A. §§ 1462a(e), 1467a, 1813(q)(4) (West 1989 & Supp. 1991) (describing the authority of the DOTS under HOLA and FDIA). For all pertinent purposes of this study, its authority is practically identical to that of the FHLBB.
12. See infra notes 40-89 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 90-116 and accompanying text.
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and of the need for changes at the statutory or administrative level.14

This Article concludes that the section 12(i) delegation of authority
to these agencies has not fulfilled in practice the expectations evident

in the language of the section and its legislative history, and that
fundamental changes are warranted in the section 12(i) delegation
approach.15
A.

Limitations on Authority

1. Authority Under the 1934 Act

While the agencies have longstanding, substantive concerns over
what might be broadly described as "securities regulation," ' in the
narrow sense of the term as usually understood in federal regulatory
law, the agencies are limited to administering specified provisions of
the 1934 Act concerning the respective depository institutions for

which each is the "appropriate Federal banking agency."' 7 Hence,
14. See infra notes 117-42 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 143-50 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., 1 M.P. MALLOY, supra note 3, at 408-66 (1988 & Supp. 1991) (reviewing
varied regulatory concerns of agencies with respect to securities of depository institutions).
17. The term "appropriate Federal banking agency" is a technical term of art within
federal bank regulatory law, defined to mean:
(1) the Comptroller of the Currency, in the case of any national banking association, any District [of Columbia] bank, or any Federal branch or agency of a foreign
bank;
(2) the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, in the case of
(A) any State member insured bank (except a District bank),
(B) any branch or agency of a foreign bank with respect to any provision of the
Federal Reserve Act which is made applicable under the International Banking Act
of 1978,
(C) any foreign bank which does not operate an insured branch,
(D) any agency or commercial lending company other than a Federal agency,
and
(E) supervisory or regulatory proceedings arising from the authority given to
the Board of Governors under section 7(c)(1) of the International Banking Act of
1978, including such proceedings under the Depository Institutions Supervisory Act,
and
(F) any bank holding company and any subsidiary of a bank holding company
(other than a bank);
(3) the Federal Deposit Insurance Company in the case of a State nonmember insured bank (except a District bank), or a foreign bank having an insured branch;
and
(4) the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision in the case of any savings association or any savings and loan holding company.
12 U.S.C.A. § 1813(q)(1)-(4) (1989). As shown below, this same division of responsibility is
followed under section 12(i) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, with the exception of, for
example, BHCs and SLHCs, which are directly regulated by the SEC under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. See infra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
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the direct experience of the agencies with respect to securities regulation is limited to administering the 1934 Act provisions-generally
governing regulation of securities of publicly traded issuers already
in the secondary market. In addition, their involvement in administering the 1934 Act is itself limited in three ways by the terms of the

delegation of authority in section 12(i) itself.
2.

JurisdictionalLimitations

The most obvious limitation on the scope of the agencies' authority under the 1934 Act is with respect to specified classes of issuers, whereas the SEC has plenary authority under the 1934 Act with
respect to all classes of issuers covered by the Act.' 8 In contrast, the

Comptroller's authority extends only to national banks,"9 the Fed's

to state-chartered Fed-member banks,20 the FDIC's to state-

chartered, nonmember, insured banks, 2 ' and, in the case of the OTS,
authority extends to insured savings associations.22
3.

Substantive Limitations

The authority of the agencies to administer the 1934 Act is also

limited to specified provisions of the Act.2 3 These substantive provisions concern: (1) the registration requirement of section 12;24 (2)
the periodic reporting requirements of section 13;25 (3) the proxy
and tender offer disclosure provisions of section 14;16 and, (4) the
insider reporting and trading liability provisions of section 16.21 Sig18. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 78d, 781(a), (b), (g) (1988) (establishing the SEC and
describing the coverage of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act as to publicly traded issuers).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 781(i)(1) (1988).
20. Id. § 781(i)(2).
21. Id. § 781(i)(3).
22. Id. § 781(i)(4). Prior to the enactment of the FIRREA, supra note 3, the now defunct FHLBB had 1934 Securities Exchange Act authority over institutions, the deposits of
which are insured by the now defunct FSLIC. See 15 U.S.C. § 781(i)(4) (1982), amended by
FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 744(u)(2), 103 stat 183, 441 (1989).
23. See 15 U.S.C. § 781(i)(1988) (delegating authority "to administer and enforce [15
U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78n(a), 78n(c), 78n(d), 78n(f), and 78 p.").
24. See 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1988); L. Loss supra note 1, at 406-33 (discussing the registration requirement); see also 1 M.P. MALLOY, supra note 3, at 498-501 (discussing the registration requirement as applied to depository institutions).
25. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1988); L. Loss, supra note 1, at 433-36 (discussing the reporting requirements); see also 1 M.P. MALLOY, supra note 3, at 501-03 (discussing the reporting requirements as applied to depository institutions).
26. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a),(c),(d),(f) (1988); L. Loss, supra note 1, at 449-532 (discussing the proxy and tender offer disclosure requirements); see also I M.P. MALLOY, supra
note 3, at 520-25 (discussing the requirements as applied to depository institutions).
27. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1988); L. Loss, supra note 1, at 541-82 (discussing the insider
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nificantly, the general antifraud provisions of the 1934 Act, sections
10(b) and 14(e), 28 are not included in the delegation of authority to
the agencies, and the authority over these enforcement provisions remains with the SEC, even in situations involving depository
institutions.2 9
4. The "substantiallysimilar" Limitation
Finally, as currently in force 30 section 12(i) requires the agencies, in administering the substantive provisions delegated to them,
to promulgate implementing regulations "substantially similar ... to

regulations and rules issued by the [Securities and Exchange] Commission" under the same sections of the 1934 Act, unless they publish, in the Federal Register, findings and reasons to the effect that
implementation of such regulations "are not necessary or appropriate
in the public interest or for the protection of investors. 31 Such implementing regulations, or the requisite findings and reasons, are required to be published within 60 days of any changes made in SEC
regulations and rules. 2
Problems of Implementation
Given the peculiar division of authority mandated by section
12(i), certain problems naturally suggest themselves. A review of the
actual experience of the agencies in administering the 1934 Act
would appear to confirm that these potential problems have
materialized.33
B.

1. Complexity and Duplication of Effort
There can be no doubt that the regulatory system resulting from
section 12(i) is complex. It results necessarily in a virtual duplication
of effort, since the initiative for securities regulation remains with
trading provisions of section 16); see also 1 M.P. MALLOY, supra note 3, at 503-20 (discussing
the provisions as applied to depository institutions).
28. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78n(e) (1988).
29. See SEC v. Warner, 652 F. Supp. 647 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (discussing SEC enforcement of antifraud provisions of the 1933 Securities Act and 1934 Securities Exchange Act);

see also 1 M.P. MALLOY, supra note 3, at 525-35 (discussing arguments with respect to antifraud authority and concluding that this authority remains with the SEC).
30. See infra notes 82-84 and accompanying text (discussing the amendment of section
12(i) to require "substantially similar" regulations).
31.
32.
33.

15 U.S.C. § 781(i) (1988).
Id.
See infra notes 117-47 and accompanying text (criticizing the current system under

section 12(i)).
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the SEC, and the agencies are required to react to such initiatives in
a "substantially similar" manner. One may reasonably question
whether such duplication is justified on any principled grounds.3 4
2. Timeliness of Regulatory Amendments
The admittedly complex situation engendered by section 12(i) is
exacerbated by the fact that the mandate of that section has for the
most part been ignored by the agencies. 35 This has rendered the regulatory environment, already confusing due to the duplication of effort inherent in section 12(i), even more-and unjustifiablyconfusing.
3. Incorporation by Reference
Neither the FHLBB, nor its successor, the OTS, has ever had a
problem with timeliness under section 12(i). Unfortunately, this
agency has achieved its perfect record in this regard simply by incorporating by reference all pertinent SEC regulations and subsequent
amendments.3 6 The Fed has since followed the FHLBB/OTS
model.3 7 This practice raises a serious question concerning its consistency with the expectations of section 12(i) in delegating 1934 Act
authority38 and concerning the agencies' compliance with other generally applicable administrative principles. 39
II.

ANALYSIS OF STATUTORY AUTHORITY

A. Favored Treatment of Securities Issued by Depository
Institutions
One distinctive feature of federal regulation of securities issued
by depository institutions is that they receive relatively favored, or at
least differentiated, treatment. As a general rule, these securities are
34. See infra notes 138-42 and accompanying text (discussing arguments concerning
justification of current duplication of effort).
35. See infra notes 89-115 and accompanying text (reviewing experience of the agencies
in administering section 12(i)); see also Charts 1-3, infra (indicating significant delays in
implementation).
36.

See 12 C.F.R. § 563d.1 (1990).

37. See 52 Fed. Reg. 49,374 (1987) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 208.16 (1990)) (identifying
1934 Securities Exchange Act requirements for State member banks and incorporating SEC
"rules, regulations and forms.").
38. See infra note 108 and accompanying text (discussing consistency of incorporation
by reference approach with section 12(i)).
39. See infra notes 109-12 and accompanying text (discussing consistency of incorporation by reference with Federal Register Act).
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not subject to the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act).4" Furthermore,
although they may be subject to the 1934 Act, they generally are not

subject to the administrative authority of the SEC.41

Thus, the treatment of such securities results in two levels of

discontinuity in federal policy with respect to securities regulation.
First, in principle, the initial issuance of these securities in the distribution market generally is exempt from the federal system of securities regulation, while in the context of the trading or secondary market for securities, these securities generally are subject to the federal

system of continuous disclosure. Second, at the administrative level,
while virtually all other issuers subject to federal securities regulation are subject to the administrative authority of the SEC, depository institution issuers are subject to the administrative authority, of
the appropriate federal regulatory agencies, not the SEC, except

with respect to enforcement of the antifraud provisions of42 federal
securities laws, authority for which remains with the SEC.

B. Securities Issued by Depository Institutions and the 1933

Act
Bank- and thrift-issued securities generally are exempt from the

registration requirements of the 1933 Act. 43 These exemptions may
40. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a to 77aa (1988); see infra notes 43-50 and accompanying text
(discussing the applicability of the 1933 Securities Act to securities issued by depository
institutions).
41. See 15 U.S.C. § 781(i) (1988); see infra notes 50-89 and accompanying text (discussing the administration of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act with respect to securities issued by depository institutions).
42. See, e.g., SEC v. Warner, 652 F. Supp. 647 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (involving SEC antifraud enforcement, despite section 12(i) delegation to FHLBB); see supra note 29 and accompanying text.
43. See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (1988). This section provides in pertinent part as follows:
Except as hereinafter expressly provided, the provisions of [the 1933 Securities
Act] shall not apply to any of the following classes of securities:
(2) Any security issued or guaranteed by ...

any bank; ...

or any interest or

participation in any common trust fund or similar fund maintained by a bank exclusively for the collective investment and reinvestment of assets contributed thereto by
such bank in its capacity as trustee, executor, administrator, or guardian; ... or any
interest or participation in a single trust fund, or in a collective trust fund maintained by a bank [subject to certain qualifications] ....

(5) Any security issued (A) by a savings and loan association, building and
loan association, cooperative bank, homestead association, or similar institution,
which is supervised and examined by State or Federal authority having supervision
over any such institution

. ..
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be explained in part by the simultaneous congressional consideration
of the Banking Act of 1933 Securities, which was intended to adthe need for expanded federal regulation of comdress more directly
44
banks.
mercial
Despite these exemptions, the general antifraud provisions of
the 1933 Act do, by their own terms, apply to bank and thrift issued
securities. 45 Furthermore, while judicial interpretation of the exemptions has been somewhat sparse, the courts have tended to interpret
the scope of the exemptions rather narrowly, in light of the remedial
purposes of the Act.4
Id.
As originally enacted, the exemption contained in section 77c(a)(5) (section 3(a)(5) of
the 1933 Securities Act) applied only to an institution "substantially all the business of which
is confined to the making of loans to members .... " This language was replaced in 1970 by
the present requirement that the institution be supervised and examined by a state or federal
supervisory authority. See Act of Dec. 14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 27(c), 84 Stat. 1413,
1434.
Nevertheless, despite these exemptions, the agencies have undertaken to regulate the issuance of securities through elaborate regulatory provisions not unlike the SEC 1933 Securities
Act regulations under their own regulatory statutes. See generally 1 M.P. MALLOY, supra note
3, at 408-41 (1988) (discussing Comptroller and FHLBB/OTS 1933 Securities Act analogs).
44. See 1 M.P. MALLOY, supra note -3, at 400-02 (discussing the interrelationship between the 1933 Securities Act and the Banking Act of 1933, commonly known as the GlassSteagall Act); see also 2 M.P. MALLOY, supra note 3, at 559-72 (reviewing the legislative
history of the Glass-Steagall Act).
45. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a), (c) (1988). This section provides as follows:
(a) Use of interstate commerce for purpose of fraud or deceit
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the
use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate
commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly (1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
(c) Exemptions of section 77c not applicable to this section
The exemptions provided in section 77c of this title [section 3 of the 1933
Securities Act] shall not apply to the provisions of this section.
Id. (emphasis added).
The exemptions for bank- and thrift-issued securities are among those provided in section
3. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. The antifraud provisions of section 12(2) of the
1933 Securities Act do not apply, by their own terms, to bank-issued securities. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 771(2) (1988) (stating "whether or not exempted by the provisions of section 77c of this title,
other than paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of said section.").
46. For a useful discussion of the legislative history of the exemption of thrift issued
securities in particular, see Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 340-42 (1967). The Seventh
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These two exemptions "are to be strictly construed and . . . the
47
burden of proof rests upon the party who claims the exemption,
consistent with the generally applicable judicial interpretation of exemptions from regulatory statutes. The courts generally have not
been willing to decide the question of an exemption's applicability
solely on the basis of the "name or charter powers" of the institution, but, rather, have insisted upon an examination of "the character of business actually done by the corporation" as the controlling
issue.4 8 This approach appears to be directly supported by the language of each exemption itself 4 9 Given these judicial attitudes, the
cases involving
exemptions have been held to be unavailable in 5many
0
thrift.
or
bank
a
by
issued
securities ostensibly
C. Securities Issued by Depository Institutions
and the 1934 Act
Regardless of the scope of its coverage, the application of the
1934 Act does not differ in principle as between the securities of
depository institutions and those of other issuers. As originally enacted, the 1934 Act5" prohibited any member of a national securities
exchange, broker or dealer from effecting any transaction in any
Circuit also referred to this legislative history in Tcherepnin v. Knight, 371 F.2d 374, 378 (7th
Cir. 1967), but its reading of the legislative history was rejected by the Supreme Court. See
Tcherepnin, 389 U.S. at 342 n.30. See generally 1 M.P. MALLOY, supra note 3, at 376-77
(1988) (discussing Tcherepnin).
47. SEC v. American Int'l Say. & Loan Ass'n, 199 F. Supp. 341, 347 (D. Md. 1961)
(citing SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 126 (1953)); see FTC v. Morton Salt Co.,
334 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1948); Spokane & Inland Empire R.R. Co. v. United States, 241 U.S.
344, 350 (1916); accord Capital Funds, Inc. v. SEC, 348 F.2d 582, 586 (8th Cir. 1965) (citing
Edwards v. United States, 312 U.S. 473 (1941)); SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241 (2d Cir.
1959); Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1959); SEC v. Sunbeam Gold
Mines Co., 95 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1938); see also Melton v. Unterreiner, 436 F. Supp. 740,
743 (E.D. Mo. 1977), modified and aff'd, 575 F.2d 204, 207 (8th Cir. 1978) (quoting Capital
Funds, 348 F.2d at 586).
48. American Int'l, 199 F. Supp. at 347 (citing Bowers v. Lawyers Mortgage Co., 285
U.S. 182, 188 (1932)); see also Capital Funds, 348 F.2d at 586 (holding that the exemption
for banking institutions is applicable where a business is "substantially confined to banking"
(emphasis in original)); Melton, 436 F. Supp. at 743; SEC v. Heritage Trust Co., 402 F. Supp.
744, 749 (D. Ariz. 1975).
49. See supra note 43 and accompanying text; see also American Int'l, 199 F. Supp. at
347 (quoting the original language of section 3(a)(5)); Capital Funds, 348 F.2d at 586 (discussing the language of section of 3(a)(2)); Melton, 436 F. Supp. at 743 (construing the language of the exemption); Melton, 575 F.2d at 207 & n.4 (discussing the language of section
3(a)(2)); cf. 12 U.S.C. § 36(f) (1988) (defining "branch").
50. See 1 M.P. MALLOY, supra note 3, at 403-08 (discussing exemption cases).
51. Act of June 6, 1934, ch. 404, tit. I, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§
78a to 7811 (1988)).
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nonexempt security52 on a national securities exchange, unless the
security was registered under the Act.53 Registration required disclosure in the filing of a range of material information required by
the 1934 Act,54 as prescribed by the SEC.55 Such filings generally
are publicly available.56
Registration of a class of securities under the 1934 Act also imposed other continuing periodic reporting requirements and other requirements on the issuer of such securities. For example, issuers of
such securities were required to file with the SEC periodic and other
reports containing material and other information prescribed by the
SEC. 57 Registration also triggered the application of the 1934 Act
provisions concerning the conduct of, and required disclosure to,
stockholders with respect to proxy solicitations. 58 Finally, registration triggered reporting requirements for directors, officers and principal stockholders of such issuers with respect to their beneficial
ownership of equity securities and any subsequent change in such
ownership. 59 Such persons were strictly liable for any short-swing
profits resulting from their purchase and sale, or sale and purchase,
of such securities within any six-month period.60
Since the 1934 Act registration requirement was essentially
triggered by trading (and, hence, listing) of securities on a national
securities exchange, the securities of depository institutions potentially were within the scope of the 1934 Act as originally enacted. In
fact, the impact of the 1934 Act upon such institutions was minimal.
Previously listed commercial banks had been delisting their securities from the national exchanges even before the passage of the
Act.6 1 By April 1963, the securities of only five banks were listed on
52. This refers to being nonexempt under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. See 15
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(12) (1988).

53. 15 U.S.C. § 781(a) (1988). For the procedures and requirements for 1934 Securities
Exchange Act registration, see id. § 781(b). See also 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.12b-I to 240.12b-37
(1990).
54.
55.
56.

See 15 U.S.C. § 781(b) (1988).
See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.12b-20 to 240.12b-25 (1990).
See, e.g., id. §§ 240.24b-1 to 240.24b-3 (1990).

See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1988).
See id § 78n.
Id. § 78p(a).
Id. § 78p(b). For a fascinating alternative reading of section 16 and its legislative
see Thel, The Genius of Section 16: Regulating the Management of Publicly Held
Companies, 42 HASTrNGs L.J. 391 (1991).
61. See SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS (pt. 3), at 36, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. (1963) [hereinafter SPECIAL STUDY].
57.
58.
59.
60.
purpose,
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any registered national securities exchange.6 2

By the early 1960's, increasing concern over the significance of
the over-the-counter (OTC) securities markets prompted Congress in
1961 to require the SEC to undertake a special study of these markets.

3

Among the results of that study were legislative proposals for

amendments to the 1934 Act designed to bring OTC bank securities
under the act for the first time.6 4 Despite the existing examination
and reporting requirements imposed by federal and state bank regulatory laws,65 none of these requirements appeared to serve adequately the objective of protection
of investors 6 -- one central focus
of federal securities laws. 7 The SEC therefore took the position that
62. See id. Almost from the enactment of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, SEC regulations contained a "temporary exemption," Rule 12a-1, exempting exchange-listed bank securities from the registration requirement of the act. See Exchange Act Release No. 291
(1935), revoked Exchange Act Release No. 18,853, 25 SEC Docket 794 (1982). This exemption was supposed to be effective pending adoption of an appropriate registration form, but in
light of the extremely small number of affected banks, the form was never adopted. See SPECIAL STUDY

(pt. 3), supra note 61, at 36 & n.62.

63. See Act of Sept. 5, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-196, 75 Stat. 465 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §
78s(d) (1988)).
64. For a discussion of the Special Study and its recommendations with respect to OTC
bank securities, see 1 M.P. MALLOY, supra note 3, at 484-87.
65. See SPECIAL STUDY (pt. 3), supra note 61, at 36-38.
66. The Comptroller of the Currency had, in fact, imposed a reporting requirement on
national banks under his general authority to require special reports under the National Bank
Act, but these reports were confidential. See 12 U.S.C. § 161 (1988); see also SPECIAL STUDY
(pt. 3), supra note 61, at 36 & n.63. In addition, the Comptroller had recently promulgated
disclosure regulations roughly analogous to the periodic, proxy, and insider trading disclosure
requirements of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. See id. at 37. However, the SEC's assessment of these regulations was that they were inadequate to the task of affording meaningful
disclosure protection to investors. The Special Study stated in this regard:
The recent efforts of the Comptroller to improve the lot of bank shareholders
...take only a modest step toward the full protections afforded by sections 13, 14,
and 16 [of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act]. The Comptroller has required national banks to send annual reports to their shareholders. The [1934 Securities Exchange Act] and [SEC] rules under it require annual reports to be sent to shareholders when proxies are solicited, but additionally more detailed and more frequent
financial reports are required to be filed with the [SEC]. The Comptroller's proxy
regulation requires either less complete disclosure in relation to options for officers
and directors and transactions of such persons with the bank or no disclsoure at all.
No provision is made, moreover, for examination of proxy materials before their use.
Similarly, no provision is made for the presentation of proposals by persons not affiliated with management. The insider-trading provisions, finally, are mere reporting
provisions; nothing like the recovery provision of section 16(b) [of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988)] is included.
Id. at 39.
67. See generally Comptroller of the Currency v. Lance, 632 F. Supp. 437 (N.D. Ga.
1986) (stating that the purpose of 1934 Securities Exchange Act section 12(i) is to provide
investor protection).
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the protections afforded by the 1934 Act were "clearly needed." 8
The SEC's initial draft bill, circulated for industry comment in
April 1963, would have amended section 12 of the 1934 Act by adding a new subsection as follows: "In respect of any security issued
by a bank all powers, functions, and duties of the Commission pursuant to the provisions of this subsection shall vest in (the appropriate
banking regulatory authority) ."69 The draft, submitted to an industry liaison committee, was based essentially upon the recommendations of the special study.70 However, the SEC "had not reached a
final determination with respect to all of the subsidiary questions as
to the exact form of the legislation." 1 The language of the above
quoted draft section 12(i) as finally introduced in Congress had been
redrafted to read as follows:
In respect of any securities issued by banks the powers, functions and duties of the Commission pursuant to the provisions of
this title shall be delegated in whole or in part to the federal banking regulatory agency or instrumentality which has jurisdiction to
examine or supervise the business 72of such banks, upon the request
of such agency or instrumentality.
The proposal attracted considerable attention from both interested federal agencies and private groups.7 3 The delegation provision
was criticized by the Fed, though it conceded in principle that bank
securities should be subject to the disclosure provisions of the 1934
Act. 4 The Fed questioned the advisability of the delegation provision and argued that, if the disclosure provisions of the Act were
made applicable to banks with OTC securities, it should be adminis68. SPECIAL STUDY (pt. 3), supra note 61, at 38.
69. Hearings on S.1642 Before the Subcomm. of The Committee on Banking and Currency United States Senate, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1963) (statement of William L. Cary,
Chairman Securities & Exchange Commission).
70. Memorandum of the Securities and Exchange Commission with respect to Changes
in H.R. 6789 between its Submission to the Industry Liaison Committee and its Introduction
in Congress, reprinted in Investor Protection, Part 1: Hearings on H.R. 6789, H.R. 6793, S.
1642 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 652, 652 (1963-64) [hereinafter House
Hearings].
71. House Hearings, supra note 70, at 652; see also SPECIAL STUDY (pt. 1), supra note
61, at ix (Letter of Transmittal to the Congress from Chairman Cary, April 3, 1963).
72. H.R. 6789, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
73. See House Hearings, supra note 70, at 652.
74. See Letter from Win. McC. Martin, Jr. to Rep. Harris, Chairman, House Interstate
and Foreign Commerce Committee (June 21, 1963), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 1418, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1964) [hereinafter Harris Letter].
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tered by the SEC, not the regulatory agencies."5 The FDIC took the
contrary view, arguing that the delegation to the federal bank regulatory agencies should be mandatory rather than discretionary.76 The
Senate version of the bill, S. 1642, adopted the FDIC suggestions,
and it was this version that was eventually enacted as section 12(i).11
78
The House Report adopted this approach as well.
Accordingly, as to securities issued by FDIC-insured national
and district banks, state-chartered member banks and statechartered non-member banks, administration and enforcement of
sections 12, 13, 14(a), 14(c), 14(d) and 14(f), and 16 were vested
respectively in the Comptroller, the Fed and the FDIC. 0 The detachment of this authority from the SEC was complete. The three
agencies had the power to make rules and regulations as may be
necessary for the execution of the functions vested in them and none
of the rules, regulations, forms or orders issued or adopted by the
SEC were binding in any way upon such officers and agencies in the
performance of their functions. Similarly, none of the rules or regulations were binding on any such banks in connection with the performance of their functions.8 0
So matters remained until the enactment of the Williams Act in
1968,81 which amended section 12(i) to include references to new
subsections 78n(d) and 78n(f) (sections 14(d) and 14(f) of the Act),
dealing with the regulation of tender offers. The Act left section
12(i) otherwise unchanged.
75.

See id. at 33-34. The letter provides:

[T]he [Federal Reserve] Board considers it inadvisable to provide that these
and other provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, in their application to

banks, may be administered by an agency other than the Commission ....

Under

[proposed section 12(i)], responsibility would be fragmented and the tasks performed less efficiently . . . . Accordingly the Board concludes that the reporting,

proxy, and "insider trading" provisions of the 1934 Act should be administered by
the Commission in their application to banks as well as in their application gener-

ally, and therefore recommends* the deletion of [proposed section 12(i)].
Id.
76. See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 70, at 68-69 (Letter to Rep. Harris from
Director Wolcott (Nov. 19, 1963)).
77. See 109 CONG. REc. 13726 (1963) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
78. See H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 74, at 31.
79. 15 U.S.C. § 781(i)(1)-(3) (1970). For a useful discussion of the legislative history of
section 12(i), see 6 L. Loss & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 1768-71.
80. 15 U.S.C. § 781(i) (1988).
81. Act of July 29, 1968 Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (codified as amended at 15

U.S.C. § 781 (1988)).
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The Depository Institutions Act of 197482 added the language
that brought FSLIC-insured institutions within the scope of section
12(i) and authorized the FHLBB to promulgate 1934 Act regulations. In light of the rather diffident record of the agencies in utilizing their section 12(i) authority, 83 however, the 1974 Act also
amended the subsection to require the promulgation of regulations
by the agencies that were
substantially similar . . . to regulations and rules issued by the

[SEC] under sections 781, 78m, 78n(a), 78n(c), 78n(d), 78n(f),
and 78p unless they find that implementation of substantially similar regulations with respect to insured banks and insured institutions are not necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
and the detailed
protection of investors, and publish such findings,
4
reasons therefor, in the Federal Register.
Furthermore, timeliness of this system of parallel regulations
was to be ensured by the additional requirement imposed upon the
agencies that
Such regulations ....

or the reasons for failure to publish such

substantially similar regulations to those of the [SEC], shall be
published in the Federal Register within 120 days of the date of
enactment of this subsection, and, thereafter, within 60 days of any
changes made by the [SEC] in its relevant regulations and rules.85
In fact, it appears that this clear statutory mandate has been
uniformly ignored by the agencies, either by marked delays in publication of parallel rules 8 or by virtually wholesale incorporation by
reference of SEC regulations, 7 since the enactment of the 1974 Act.
No congressional action has been taken affecting, in any substantive respect, the system of parallel regulation applicable since
the 1974 Act. However, the enactment of FIRREA, with its extensive regulatory restructuring-abolishing the FHLBB and the
FSLIC and establishing the OTS 8 -entailed certain conforming
amendments to section 12(i). FIRREA changed the reference in the
section to "banks" to read "banks and savings associations," deleted
82. Act of Oct. 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 105(b), 88 Stat. 1503 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 781 (1988)).

83. See infra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
84.
85.

15 U.S.C. § 781(i) (1976).
Id.

86. See infra notes 96-105 and accompanying text.
87. See infra notes 106-115 and accompanying text.
88.

See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
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references to "institutions the accounts of which are insured by the
[FSLIC]," and vested authority in the OTS that had previously been
89
vested in the FHLBB.
III.
A.

REGULATORY IMPLEMENTATION

Delayed Implementation of Mandated Amendments

Both before90 and after 9 ' the 1974 amendment of section 12(i)
of the 1934 Act, 92 the Comptroller, the Fed and the FDIC generally
have been extremely slow to promulgate regulations implementing
the 1934 Act, whether or not "substantially similar" to SEC regulations. The Comptroller's initial implementing regulations can be
fairly described only as skeletal,93 particularly when compared with
the relatively complete set of regulations, not unlike the analogous
SEC regulations, promulgated by the Fed and the FDIC.9 4 Indeed, it
was not until 1971 that the Comptroller acted to bring his 1934 Act
regulations into conformity with the more complete approach and
format of the corresponding regulations of the other agencies.95
In the post-1974 amendment context, final action by the regulators in promulgating "substantially similar" 1934 Act rules has been
delayed in some cases over five years after pertinent SEC amendments have been issued. 96 Failure to meet the deadline mandated by
section 12(i) of the 1934 Act9 7 has been a uniform feature of the
agencies' administration of the 1934 Act. The only explanation offered for these delays came from staff of the FDIC, who noted that
the 60-day time frame was, as a practical matter, extremely tight,
and that changes in provisions from the SEC proposed version to
89.

FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 744(u)(2), 103 Stat. 183, 441 (1989) (codified at

15 U.S.C.A. § 781(i) (West Supp. 1991)). For the current text of section 12(i), as amended by
the FIRREA, see supra note 7.

90. See infra Table 1 (selected 1934 Act issuances of agencies, pre-1974 amendment).
91.

See infra Table 2 (selected 1934 Act issuances of agencies, post-1974 amendment).

92. See supra notes 82-85 (discussing the 1974 amendment).
93. See, e.g., 29 Fed. Reg. 12,300 (1964) (current version at 12 C.F.R. §§ 10.1-12-7
(1990)) (issued under NBA statutory authority); 30 Fed. Reg. 6160 (1965) (current version at
12 C.F.R. §§ 12.1-12.7 (1990)). (issued under 1934 Act authority); 31 Fed. Reg. 6949 (1966)

(current version at 12 C.F.R. §§ 10.1-12.7 (1990)). For SEC criticism of the Comptroller's
original "stop-gap" securities regulations, see supra note 66.
94. See 30 Fed. Reg. 362 (1965) (codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 206.1-206.104, repealed by

52 Fed. Reg. 49,374 (1990)) (Fed 1934 Exchange Act regulations); id. at 396 (codified at 12
C.F.R. §§ 335.101-335.703 (1990)) (FDIC 1934 Exchange Act regulations).
95. 36 Fed. Reg. 14,997 (1971) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 11; replacing pt. 10, revising

pt. 16 and amending pt. 18).
96.

See infra Charts 1-3 (delays in promulgation).

97. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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final rule version of regulatory amendments made it difficult to anticipate the amendments that would be required of the agencies
under section 12(i). 91 The FDIC has apparently settled upon a practice of reviewing annually and updating its 1934 Act regulations.""
However, this still leaves multi-year delays unexplained.
Nor is the pattern of delays explained on the basis of agency
review and modification of SEC,1934 Act amendments, as contemplated by the 1974 amendment of section 12.100 Neither the staff of
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), 10 1 the staff of
the Fed, 102 nor the staff of the OTS 03 could recall any specific instances in which their respective agencies had invoked their authority to make and publish a finding, and detailed reasons therefor, to
the effect that an SEC 1934 Act amendment was "not necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for protection of investors.' ' 4
Staff of the FDIC noted that there were a few instances of explicit
departures from SEC amendments-particularly in the area of issuer tender offers.1°5
B. Substantive Incorporation by Reference
The now defunct FHLBB and, since the enactment of FIRREA,10 6 the OTS, have never experienced any delay in the promulgation of 1934 Act implementing regulations substantially similar to
SEC regulations. However, this situation has arisen because, in fulfilling its statutory responsibilities under section 12(i) as to insured
thrift institutions, the FHLBB simply incorporated by reference' 07
98. Interview with Gerald J. Gervino, FDIC Senior Attorney and Lawrence H. Pierce,
FDIC Securities Activities Officer, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 21, 1990) [hereinafter FDIC
Interview].
99. Id.
100. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
101. Telephone interview with Ellen Broadman, Director, OCC Securities & Corporate
Practices Division (Aug. 22, 1990) [hereinafter OCC Interview].
102. Interview with Walter McEwen, Fed Senior Attorney (Aug. 16, 1990) [hereinafter
Fed Interview].
103. Interview with Howard Bluver, OTS Assistant Chief Counsel, Washington, D.C.
(Aug. 15, 1990) [hereinafter OTS Interview].
104. 15 U.S.C. § 781(i) (1988).
105. FDIC Interview, supra note 98.
106. See supra notes 10-11, 88-89 and accompanying text (describing FIRREA transfer
of functions from FHLBB to OTS).
107. Strictly speaking, the key provisions of neither the FHLBB regulations nor the succeeding OTS regulations characterize what it is doing as an "incorporation by reference." See,
e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 563d.1 (1989) (noting that the SEC "rules, regulations and forms . . . shall
apply to securities issued by insured institutions."). However, staff of the Office of the Federal
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all "rules, regulations and forms prescribed by the [SEC] pursuant
to [the sections enumerated in section 12(i)] or applicable in connection with obligations imposed by those sections."1081
This incorporation by reference did little to satisfy the
FHLBB's 1934 Act responsibilities. The FHLBB approach neglected
the implicit assumption in section 12(i) that the'responsible regulatory agencies would assess new amendments to the SEC 1934 Act
regulations to determine the need for and appropriateness of the
amendments with respect to banks and insured institutions.10 9
Furthermore, the FHLBB approach appears to have been inconsistent with regulations promulgated by the Administrative Committee of the Federal Register (ACFR)" 0 under the authority of the
Federal Register Act."' The FHLBB, in effect, did not publish its
generally applicable 1934 Act regulations, and the net result was a
failure fully and directly to inform those subject to its regulations.
The FHLBB regulations were first promulgated and published
before the ACFR regulations were issued, interpreting the preexisting requirements of the Federal Register Act. With the transfer of
authority from the now defunct FHLBB to the OTS, identical OTS
regulations, continuing the incorporation by reference, were pubRegister (OFR) have expressed the view that, in substance and effect, the FHLBB and OTS
provisions do in fact work as an incorporation by reference. Interview with Michael White and
Fran McDonald, OFR staff, Washington, D.C. (Aug. 17, 1990) [hereinafter OFR Interview].
108. 12 C.F.R. § 563d.1 (1989). The section currently provides as follows:
In respect to any securities issued by savings associations, the powers, functions, and duties vested in the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Commission") to administer and enforce sections 12, 13, 14(a), 14(c), 14(d), 14(f), and 16
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Act") are vested in the Office. The
rules, regulations and forms prescribed by the Commission pursuant to those sections or applicable in connection with obligations imposed by those sections, shall
apply to securities issued by savings associations, except as otherwise provided in
this part. The term "Commission" as used in those rules and regulations shall with
respect to securities issued by savings associations be deemed to refer to the Office
unless the context otherwise requires. All filings with respect to securities issued by
savings associations required by those rules and regulations to be made with the
Commission shall be made with the Office by submitting such filings to the Chief
Counsel, Corporate and Securities Division, Office of Thrift Supervision, 1700 G
Street, NW., Washington, DC 20552, except as noted in § 563d.2 of this part. Except to the extent specifically provided, no filing fees specified by the Commission's
rules shall be paid to the Office.
Id. (1990).

109. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
110.

See Updating of Publication Procedures, 50 Fed. Reg. 12,462 (1985) (criticizing

the cross-referencing practices of the administrative agencies).
111. 44 U.S.C.A. §§ 1501-11 (West 1969 & Supp. 1990).
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lished in November 1989.112 Office of the Federal Register (OFR)
staff speculated that the OTS regulations were able to slip through,
despite the 1985 ACFR guidelines, due to the large volume (310
11 3
printed pages) and relative urgency of publishing the project.
In December 1987, the Fed adopted the FHLBB approach to
cross-referencing the SEC's 1934 Act regulations. 1 4 At the time, the
Fed argued that this approach was preferable "[b]ecause of the
small number of registered State member banks,"1 15 among other
reasons. If, in fact, market conditions have shifted decisively in
favor of registration of bank holding company parents of banks,
which are directly subject to SEC regulation, with a corresponding
sharp decline in 1934 Act registrations of banks and thrift institutions,116 then one may question the continuing utility of the split administrative jurisdiction created by section 12(i) of the 1934 Act.
112. See 12 C.F.R. § 563d.2 (1990). Hence, as to insured savings associations, the OTS
incorporates by reference all "rules, regulations and forms prescribed by the Commission pursuant to [the sections of the Act enumerated in section 12(i)] or applicable in connection with
obligations imposed by those sections." 12 C.F.R. § 563d.1 (1990); see also 12 C.F.R. §
563d.210 (1990) (describing the form and content of financial statements).
113. OFR Interview, supra note 107.
114. 52 Fed. Reg. 49,374 (1987) (repealing 12 C.F.R. §§ 206.1-206.104, and adding §
208.16). In particular, 12 C.F.R. § 208.16(a) (1989) provides:
(a) Filing requirements. Except as otherwise provided in this section, a State
member bank the securities of which are subject to registration pursuant to section
12(b) or section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "1934 Act") (15
U.S.C. 781 (b) and (g)) shall comply with the rules, regulations and forms adopted
by the Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission") pursuant to sections
12, 13, 14(a), 14(c), 14(d), 14(f) and 16 of the 1934 Act (15 U.S.C. 781, 78m,
78n(a), (c), (d), (f) and 78p). The term "Commission" as used in those rules and
regulations shall with respect to securities issued by State member banks be deemed
to refer to the Board unless the context otherwise requires.
Id.
115. 52 Fed. Reg. 49,374, 49,375 (1987). Fed staff has indicated that currently there
are only 34 member banks that are registered under section 12 of the 1934 Act. Fed Interview,
supra note 102.
116. The OCC staff has indicated that currently there are only approximately 70 national banks that are registered under section 12 of the 1934 Act. OCC Interview, supra note
100. The FDIC staff has indicated that currently there are only approximately 240 insured
nonmember banks that are registered under section 12 of the 1934 Act. FDIC Interview,
supra note 97. OTS staff provided documentation indicating that, as of July 1990, some 318
savings associations were registered under section 12, with another 38 savings associations
complying with current and periodic reporting requirements of the 1934 Act, though they are
not registered under section 12 because OTS securities offerings regulations impose these reporting requirements on associations filing offering circulars that become effective. 12 C.F.R.
§ 563g.18(a) (1990); OTS Interview, supra note 103.
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IV.

CRITIQUE OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM

Whatever the relative merits of the system of delegated administration contemplated by section 12(i) of the 1934 Act, the fact of
the matter is that, almost from its inception, it has not worked." 7 It
may be that, given its tight 60-day deadline" 8 and the number and
complexity of SEC amendments with which the agencies must
deal, 119 the system is not capable of timely implementation. This
possibility in itself counsels change in the current situation. Nevertheless, none of the current responses by the agencies to the problem
is an adequate alternative.
OTS staff commended the practical merits of the substantive
incorporation by reference practice that the OTS and its predecessor
agency have used since 1974.120 On the other hand, Fed staff suggested that the acceptance of an incorporation by reference approach
by the Fed may indicate that agency's preference as originally expressed in 1964121-eventually to return 1934 Act administration to
the SEC. 22
Incorporation by reference of SEC regulations and amendments
is not currently a valid alternative. 2 The ACFR has long been
skeptical of the practice, 12 4 and it formalized its criticism in published interpretive guidance on publication procedures in 1985.125
"Cross-referencing" is an impermissible "substitute for publication
in full text."'1 26 Furthermore, the potential for harm in this practice
is well recognized. "Regulatory burdens on the public are not lessened by shifting them by cross-referencing from one agency's regulations to another.' 21 The practice also "makes the Federal Register
117. See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text (discussing pre-1974 administration
of section 12(i)).
118. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
119. FDIC staff expressed particular concern over the practical difficulties of complying
with section 12(i) in light of the great number and complexity of the SEC proposed and final
1934 Securities Exchange Act amendments. FDIC Interview, supra note 98.
120. OTS Interview, supra note 103.
121. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text (discussing the Fed's position during
consideration of 1964 amendments).
122. Fed Interview, supra note 102.
123. See supra notes 105-14 and accompanying text (discussing incorporation by reference practices of the FHLBB/OTS and the Fed).
124. OFR Interview, supra note 107.
125. See I C.F.R. § 21.21 (1990).
126. 1 C.F.R. § 21.21(c) (1990).
127. 50 Fed. Reg. 12,462 (1985).
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system difficult to use.91 2 8
Another well recognized problem with cross-referencing has adverse implications for the delegation regime that Congress established with the enactment of section 12(i), as amended in 1974. The
ACFR has noted:
Cross-referencing can create procedural problems for an
agency. An untenable situation results when one agency adopts the
rules of another by cross-referencing. The first agency surrenders to
the second control over future amendments to the regulations. An
agency could find itself, because the other agency changed its regulations, referencing regulations that are irrelevant or referencing
regulations that cannot be enforced or which no longer exist.1 29
Yet it was precisely this sort of "surrender" of administrative
control (to the SEC) that Congress consciously rejected in drafting
section 12(i). 130
Inordinately delayed publication of "substantially similar"
amendments, whether on an ad hoc, occasional basis, or upon a
yearly (but possibly untimely) review, is also obviously at odds with
the clear mandate of section 12(i) of the 1934 Act. 131 Staff at the
various agencies could offer no cogent justification for the marked
and continuing departures from this publication requirement.
The pattern of delays in publication 132 is striking, and has on
occasion resulted in delays of as much as five to seven years. Staff at
the OCC, 133 the FDIC,"" and the OTS, 3 5 while without question
knowledgeable and expert in securities regulation, indicated that pertinent SEC amendments often may be informally applied as an interpretive matter, even if not yet formally incorporated in their respective regulations. .Yet surely themandate of section 12(i)-as
well as recognized principles of administrative law 38 -requires
something more than this. Current practices of the agencies in this
128. Id.
129. Id. at 12,463.
130. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
132. See infra Charts 1-3.
133. OCC Interview, supra note 101.
134. FDIC Interview, supra note 98.
135. OTS Interview, supra note 103.
136. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D) (1988) (APA
requirement); 44 U.S.C. § 1510(a) (1988) (requiring, at the discretion of the Administrative
Committee of the Federal Register, that a complete codification of each government agency's
rules be published).
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regard, whether utilizing incorporation by reference or simply delaying the inevitable, invite the suspicion that that there is "a certain
ambivalence on the part of the bank [and thrift] regulators with respect to the rigorous application of '137
federal securities regulation to
system.
banking
the
in
participants
Given the strains and inconsistencies evident in the administration of section 12(i), one must ask whether the regulatory overlap
and duplication of effort entailed by the section are acceptable. All
of the agencies are on record as opposing unnecessary duplication
and the costs that it entails. 138 In that context, all have agreed, at.
least in principle, that the elimination of section 12(i), the source of
this particular overlap and duplication, is warranted. 139 While the
SEC reaffirmed its support of the Task Group's recommendation in
April 1988,140 as well as in more recent testimony, 14 the agencies
have counselled circumspection on this issue, in light of the many
related and unrelated issues explored by the Task Group. 142 Nevertheless, the fact remains that, whatever the outcome of broader consideration of financial services reform, section 12(i) does not work as
currently constituted.
Nevertheless-surprising as it may seem-there are those who
might ask where the harm is in allowing the agencies to discharge
their section 12(i) responsibilities as they see fit. We may overlook
for the moment the modest proposition that federal agencies ought to
carry out the law in accordance with its terms, except to say that
since Congress constitutionally has determined precisely how those
responsibilities are to be discharged, altering the outcome by administrative fiat should call into question the good faith of the agencies
involved.
137. Malloy, Public Disclosure as a Tool of FederalBank Regulation, 9 ANN. REV.
BANKING L. 229, 253 (1990).
138.

See SEC. REPORT OF THE TASK GROUP ON REGULATION OF FINANCIAL SERVICES,

reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 95. 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 29-30 (1963).
139. See id. at 39-41 (discussing the "regulation by function"); id. at 91 (recommending
that 1934 Act responsibility be transferred to the SEC).
140. See SEC Memorandum to the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance
of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce Concerning Financial Services Deregulation and Repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act (Apr. 13, 1988), reprinted in [1988-1989 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 87,313 at 93,756, 93,764 (April 22, 1988).
141. See, e.g., Testimony of Richard C. Breeden, Chairman, SEC, Concerning Issues
Involving Financial Institutions and Accounting Principles Before the Sen. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs 13-17 (September 10, 1990).
142. See Letter from William Seidman, Chairman FDIC, to Hon. Edward J. Markey
(Aug. 28, 1990) (clarifying the FDIC's position that the repeal of section 12(i) must be accomplished only within the context of broader financial services reform).
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Nevertheless, the potential for harm would seem fairly evident.
As the Fed noted when section 12(i) was first under consideration,
the delegation of 1934 Act authority to the agencies has in fact resulted in a regulatory system that is "fragmented and [in which] the
tasks [are] performed less efficiently."' 43 Indeed, all of the agencies
are on record as endorsing the repeal of section 12(i) because of the
'inefficiency and duplication that it entails, even if it were imple144
mented as written.
Furthermore, the current situation is rife with potential confusion for those banks subject to the section 12(i) system. Regulations
currently applicable to these banks at any particular time may be
entirely out of step with their SEC analogs, yet the agencies on an
"informal" basis may be applying the SEC analogs, unpromulgated
and not readily available to the banks. This situation runs counter to
the basic precepts of administrative law.
Incorporation by reference approaches simply exacerbate the
potential problem involved in this situation. Clarity of application
and simple use of published codifications of federal regulations-goals of the ACFR's opposition to incorporation by reference-are inevitably compromised under the current situation.
Yet it may be suggested that there are implicit benefits in that
situation. There arguably may be a benefit to having all regulations
applicable to depository institutions administered by a unitary authority, rather than split between the SEC (for purposes of securities
regulation) and the agencies (for purposes of substantive regulation).
Yet this argument is decisively compromised by the fact that all of
the agencies have already endorsed in principle a "functional regulation" approach, entailing SEC administration of all securities regulation, in place of the current "institutional regulation" approach.145
It may also be argued that leaving section 12(i) authority in the
agencies ensures an efficient flow of information, directly available
only to those agencies in their supervision of depository institutions,
to the internal units administering the section. However, what most
often seems to occur is that the goals of securities disclosure are
abandoned, in favor of the goal of confidential, non-public regulation
that characterizes depository institutions regulation. 146
Finally, it may be argued that shareholders of depository insti143.

Harris Letter, supra note 74, at 34.

144.
145.

See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
See supra note 138.

146. See generally Malloy, supra note 137.
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tutions may be better protected by securities regulation administered
by agencies that are otherwise fully informed about the circumstances of these institutions. This self-serving argument is somewhat
undercut by the fact that the agencies have already conceded the
point that securities regulation ought to be in the hands of the SEC.
The arcane division of regulatory authority enshrined in section 12(i)
is of doubtful utility considering the relatively small number of depository institutions not already subject to SEC authority through
their registered holding companies, and may itself impede a goal of
securities regulation: the flow of information to the markets. 147
V.

CONCLUSIONS

A. Repeal of Section 12(i) of the 1934 Act
In light of the preceding discussion, there would appear to be a
strong case for the proposition that section 12(i) should be repealed.
However, summary repeal without some consideration of the indirect
consequences of such an action, as has been recently proposed by
Representative Ron Wyden, 148 is inadvisable. Repeal of section 12(i)
would not miraculously transport filings and other documentation
from the repositories of the agencies to the SEC. Nor would it resolve the systemic uncertainties about the degree to which the SEC
can be accorded access, to supervisory and enforcement files of the
agencies with respect to depository institutions registered under the
149
1934 Act.
Accordingly, while this Article recommends that section 12(i)
be repealed, this should be subject to a one-year delay in effectiveness, in order to enable the agencies delegated authority under section 12(i) to provide for an orderly transfer of pertinent records to
the SEC. Furthermore, repeal should probably be subject to an
amendment of Title 12 of the United States Code to provide for access by the SEC to supervisory and examination records pertaining
147. See Testimony of James R. Doty, SEC General Counsel, before the Subcomm. on
Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce 4-7 (Aug. 2,
1990).
148. See Blumenthal, Accounting Group Reverses Its Position, Backs Bill on Auditors
Blowing Whistle, Vall St. J., Sept. 14, 1990, at A2, col. 2.
149. For a discussion of some of the ambiguities about the application of principles of
disclosure to depository institutions that are generally regulated under a principle of confidentiality, see Malloy, supra note 137. See also Mathewson, From Confidential Supervision to
Market Discipline: The Role of Disclosure in the Regulation of Commercial Banks, 11 J.
CORP. L. 139 (1986).
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to depository institutions registered under section 12 of the Act.ao
B.

Direct Applicability of SEC Regulations

In the alternative, section 12(i) might be amended to acknowledge the apparent practical difficulties that the agencies have experienced in their attempts, or lack thereof, to meet the express deadlines imposed by the section. Incorporation by reference is
fundamentally inconsistent with the explicit mandate of section
12(i); instead, the section might be amended to impose directly the
regulations of the SEC, to be administered by the agencies. The
agencies could be given a statutory right to make a finding that variance is required from the provisions of those regulations, and to publish that finding together with the superseding regulatory provision.
To ensure timeliness of the agencies' actions in this regard, their
right to create a variance could be subject to a time limit. Thus,
section 12(i) might be amended to read as follows:
(i) In respect of any securities issued by banks and savings
associations the deposits of which are insured in accordance with
the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, the regulations and rules issued
by the Commission under sections 781, 78m, 78n(a), 78n(c),
78n(d), 78n(f), and 78p shall apply directly to such banks and savings associations, but shall be administered and enforced (1) with
respect to national banks and banks operating under the Code of
Law of the District of Columbia, by the Comptroller of the Currency, (2) with respect to all other member banks of the Federal
Reserve System, by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, (3) with respect to all other insured banks, by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, and (4) with respect to savings associations the accounts of which are insured by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, by the Office of Thrift Supervision. The
Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
and the Office of Thrift Supervision shall have the power, within 30
days of the promulgation by the Commission of any final rule
amending such regulations and rules, to make and publish in the
Federal Register a finding that implementation of such rule with
respect to insured banks and insured institutions is not necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
150. A possible analog in this regard might be 12 U.S.C. § 1821(o) (1988). This section
provides for access to records by the FDIC in connection with receiverships "which may be
used by the receiver in any manner the receiver determines to be appropriate." Id.
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C. Compliance with Section 12(i)
As a final alternative, even if policymakers could not bring
themselves to correct the impracticability of the section 12(i) delegation, the agencies must be called upon to make improvements in
their administration of the 1934 Act. Inordinate delays in publication and wholesale incorporation by reference of the regulations of
another administrative agency are neither good practice as a general
matter of administrative law, nor consistent with the mandate of section 12(i). The agencies charged with administration of section 12(i)
are urged to establish and maintain a consistent practice of regular
and timely compliance with the requirements of that section, publishing regulations substantially similar to corresponding amendments promulgated by the SEC.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1990

27

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [1990], Art. 1

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 19:269

TABLE 1
SELECTED 1934 ACT ISSUANCES BANK REGULATORY AGENCY
ACTION

PRE-1974 AMENDMENT
FED. REG. CITATION

1. OCC: August 27, 1964
Annual Report pt. 10
Proxies pt. 11
§ 16 Reports pt. 12
[NBA Authority]

29 Fed. Reg. 12,300 (1964)

2. Fed: January 12, 1965
effective January 1, 1965
Securities of Member Banks
pt. 206
[1934 Act Authority]

30 Fed. Reg. 362 (1965)

3. FDIC: January 12, 1965
effective January 1, 1965
Securities of Insured State
Nonmember Banks
pt. 335
[1934 Act Authority]

30 Fed. Reg 396 (1965)

4. OCC: February 20, 1965
Proxy contests § 11.5 (c)
[NBA Authority]

30 Fed. Reg. 2308 (1965)

5. OCC: May 1, 1965
§ 16 exemptions
[1934 Act Authority]

30 Fed. Reg. 6160 (1965)

6. Fed: May 18, 1965
Interpreting "officer"
in pt. 206

30 Fed. Reg. 6731 (1965)

7. Fed: December 7, 1965
Form F-5
Proxy solicitation by bank
management § 206.102

30 Fed. Reg. 15,089 (1965)

8. Fed: December 10, 1965
Proxy solicitation by bank
management § 206.103

30 Fed. Reg. 15,286 (1965)
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Continued
TABLE I1 Continued

TABLE
BANK REGULATORY AGENCY
ACTION
9. OCC: May 12, 1966
Annual Report pt. 10
Proxies pt. 11
§ 16 Reports pt. 12

_____________

I

FED. REG. CITATION
31 Fed. Reg. 6949 (1966)

10. Fed: April 28, 1967
§§ 206.4, 206.46 Registration of
Additional Class of Securities
of a Bank

32 Fed. Reg. 6552 (1967)

11. OCC: May 10, 1967
Annual Report pt. 10
Financial Statements pt. 18

32 Fed. Reg. 7070 (1967)

12. OCC: October 7, 1967
Minority stockholder proposals

32 Fed. Reg. 13,962 (1967)

§ 11.3
13. OCC: December 6, 1967
§ 16 Ownership Reports pt. 12

32 Fed. Reg. 17,468 (1967)

14. Fed: December 6, 1967
Beneficial ownership § 206.2
Minority stockholder proposals

32 Fed. Reg. 17,469 (1967)

§ 206.5
15. FDIC: December 6, 1967
Beneficial ownership § 335.2
Minority stockholder proposals

32 Fed. Reg. 17,470 (1967)

§ 335.5
16. Fed: August 10, 1968
Tender offers §§ 206.4, 206.5,
206.47, 206.51, 206.53
[Williams Act effective
July 29, 1968]

33 Fed. Reg. 11,394 (1968)

17. OCC: August 15, 1968
Proxies/Tender Offers pt. 11
§ 16 Ownership Reports pt. 12
[Williams Act]

33 Fed. Reg. 11,587 (1968)

18. FDIC: August 15, 1968
Tender offers §§ 335.4, 335.5,
335.47, 335.51, 335.53
[Williams Act]

33 Fed. Reg. 11,589 (1968)

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1990

29

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [1990], Art. 1

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol, 19:269

TABLE 1 Continued
BANK REGULATORY AGENCY
ACTION

FED. REG. CITATION

19. OCC: August 17, 1968
[Explaning August 15 issue]

33 Fed. Reg. 11,705 (1968)

20. Fed: December 30, 1969
Financial statements, proxies,
other reports and forms
§§ 206.2-206.5, 206.7, 206.42,
206.44, 206.71

34 Fed. Reg. 20,304 (1969)

21. FDIC: December 30, 1969
Financial statements, proxies,
other reports and forms
§§ 335.2-335.5, 335.7, 335.42,
335.44, 335.46, 335.51,
335.71

34 Fed. Reg. 20,318 (1969)

22. FDIC: January 10, 1970
Correction of December 30, 1969
issue §§ 335.42, 335.71

35 Fed. Reg. 385 (1970)

23. FDIC: January 20, 1970
Correction of December 30, 1969
issue § 335.71

35 Fed. Reg. 760 (1970)

24. OCC: September 16, 1970
Annual Report pt. 10 to Stockholders

35 Fed. Reg. 14,502 (1970)

25. Fed: February 11, 1971
Tender Offers and other Stock
Acquisitions; Registration
Statements and Reports; Proxy
statements §§ 206.4-206.5 [1970
1934 Act Amendments effective
December 22, 1970]

36 Fed. Reg. 2862 (1971)

26. FDIC: March 3, 1971
Registration statements and
reports, Proxies §§ 335.4-335.5
[1970 1934 Act Amendments]

36 Fed. Reg. 3959 (1971)

27. OCC: August 12, 1971
Securities Act Disclosure
Regulations - pt. 11
[1934 Act regulations conformed to Fed's regulations]

36 Fed. Reg. 14,997 (1971)
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TABLE

1 Continued

BANK REGULATORY AGENCY

ACTION

FED. REG. CITATION
__________________________________________

28. OCC: November 10, 1971
Forms F-2, F-7, F-8
§§ 11.42, 11.61, 11.62

36 Fed. Reg. 21,451 (1971)

29. OCC: January 29, 1972
Forms F-9, A, B, C, and D § 11.71

37 Fed. Reg. 1458 (1972)

30. OCC: December 5, 1972
§ 16 exemption
§ 11.6

37 Fed. Reg. 25,818 (1972)

31. FDIC: May 31, 1973
Technical correction; redesignation of Executive Secretary
§ 335.3

38 Fed. Reg. 14,265 (1973)

32. OCC: August 13, 1974
Financial statements; disclosure
of standby letters of credit
§ 11.7

39 Fed. Reg. 28,974 (1974)

33. Fed: August 17, 1974
Financial statements; disclosure
of standby letters of credit

39 Fed. Reg. 29,916 (1974)

§ 206.7
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TABLE 2
SELECTED 1934 ACT ISSUANCES - POST-1974 AMENDMENT
BANK REGULATORY AGENCY
FED. REG. CITATION/SEC
ACTION
ACTION
34. FDIC: October 8, 1975
40 Fed. Reg. 47,346 (1975) SEC: 36
Audited financial statements
Fed. Reg. 13,915 (July 28, 1971)
35. FDIC: February 3, 1976
319 corrections to October 8,
1975 issue

41 Fed. Reg. 4889 (1976)

36. OCC: October 12, 1976
Financial reporting requirements
and other amendments
§§ 11.2-11.7, 11.41, 11.42,
11.44, 11.45, 11.51, 11.61,
11.62, 11.71, 11.102

41 Fed. Reg. 44,822 (1976)
SEC: October 6, 1975

37. Fed: October 21, 1976
Financial statements, Form F-4,
Form F-9A §§ 206.7, 206.44,
206.71

41 Fed. Reg. 46,427 (1976)

38. Fed: January 17, 1977
Financial statements § 206.71

42 Fed. Reg. 3171 (1977)

39. FDIC: March 9, 1977
Disclosure of interim results
in financial reports §§ 335.4,
335.7, 335.41, 335.44, 335.51

42 Fed. Reg. 13,104 (1977)

40. FDIC: March 21, 1977
Correction to March 9, 1977
issue

42 Fed. Reg. 15,307 (1977)

41. FDIC: December 2, 1977
Correction to March 9, 1977
issue

42 Fed. Reg. 61,249 (1977)
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TABLE 2 (Continued)________

BANK REGULATORY AGENCY
ACTION

_________

FED. REG. CITATION/SEC
ACTION

42. OCC: December 28, 1978
Confidential treatment, proxy
dissemination to beneficial
owners, preliminary proxy
material, shareholder proposals, tender offers §§ 11.211.5, 11.7, 11.41-11.44,
11.47, 11.51, 11.54, 11.71

43 Fed. Reg. 60,537 (1978)
SEC: 43 Fed. Reg. 7651 (1978)
43 Fed. Reg. 18484 (1978)
43 Fed. Reg. 29767 (1978)

43. Fed: December 28, 1978
Current reports, Proxies, § 16
reports, Form F-2, Form F-3,
Form F-4, Form F-5, Form F-I1,
Form F-13 §§ 206.4-206.6,
206.42-206.44, 206.47, 206.51,
206.54

43 Fed. Reg. 60,549 (1978)

44. FDIC: December 28, 1978
Beneficial ownership, registration, proxies, shareholder
proposals, financial statements, Form F-i, Form F-2,
Form F-3, Form F-4, Form F-5,
Form F-9, Form F-I1, Form F-13
§§ 335.2, 335.4, 335.5, 335.7,
335.41-335.44, 335.47, 335.51,
335.54, 335.71

43 Fed. Reg. 60,561 (1978)

45. Fed: January 26, 1979
Correction to December 28, 1978
issue § 206.54

44 Fed. Reg. 5391 (1979)

46. FDIC: January 30, 1979
Correction to December 28, 1978
issue § 335.4

44 Fed. Reg. 5869 (1979)
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TABLE 2 (Continued)

FED. REG. CITATION/SEC
ACTION

BANK REGULATORY AGENCY
ACTION
47. FDIC: November 27, 1979
Acquisition statements, Shareholder proposals, Form S-K
simplification, Corporate governance, Management remuneration, Management indebtedness,
Changes in independent accountants, auditor fees, technical corrections §§ 335.2,
335.4-335.6, 335.41-335.44,
335.46-335.48, 335.51

44 Fed. Reg. 67,627 (1979)

44 Fed. Reg. 67,961 (1979)
48. Fed: November 28, 1979
Beneficial ownership and acquisition statements, Corporate
governance, Management remuneration, Independent auditor
fees, simplication and other
SEC amendments §§ 206.4,
206.5, 206.41-206.44, 206.47,
206.48, 206.51
44 Fed. Reg. 69,614 (1979)
49. OCC: December 4, 1979
Beneficial ownership, Shareholder proposals, Corporate governance, Management remuneration,
Independent accountants and
auditors fees §§ 11.4, 11.5,
11.41-11.44, 11.47, 11.48,
11.51, 11.54
44 Fed. Reg. 76,754 (1979)
50. FDIC: December 28, 1979
Corrections to November 27, 1979
issue
51. FDIC: September 15, 1980
Form and content of financial
statements, Form F-9 §§ 335.7,
335.41, 335.51, 335.71

45 Fed. Reg. 60,885 (1980)
SEC: 43 Fed. Reg. (Sep 7, 1978)
Regulation S-X, Article 9

52. Fed: October 2, 1980
Form and content of financial
statements, Form F-9 §§ 206.7,
206.71

45 Fed. Reg. 65,184 (1980)

.1.
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TABLE 2 (Continued)

BANK REGULATORY AGENCY
ACTION

_______________

FED. REG. CITATION/SEC
ACTION
(1981)
38,810
46,736
49,406
68,764
70,236
33,957

53. OCC: January 22, 1981
Tender offers, Corporate governance, Proxy voting advice,
Dividend reimbursement plans
§§ 11.3, 11.5, 11.6, 11.51,
11.53, 11.54

46 Fed. Reg. 6865
SEC: 44 Fed. Reg.
44 Fed. Reg.
44 Fed. Reg.
44 Fed. Reg.
44 Fed. Reg.
45 Fed. Reg.

54. Fed: February 6, 1981
Safe harbor from liability for
projections, Corporate governance, Dividend reinvestment
plans, Tender offers; Interpretation-issuer tender offers, going-private transactions; technical amendments
§§ 206.3, 206.5, 206.6, 206.8,
206.41, 206.42, 206.44,
206.51, 206.53 (redesignated
206.81), 206.54 (redesignated
206.82), 206.104

46 Fed. Reg. 11,237 (1981)

55. Fed. March 11, 1981
Correction to February 6, 1981
issue § 206.

46 Fed. Reg. 16,089 (1981)

56. Fed: April 14, 1981
Correction to February 6, 1981
issue § 206.5

46 Fed. Reg. 21,747 (1981)

57. FDIC: May 5, 1981
Safe harbor for projections,
Foreign bank reporting, Corporate governance, Dividend
reinvestment plans, tender
offers, Issuer tender offers,
Going-private transactions,
§ 16(b) exemption New
Format for 12 C.F.R. pt. 335

46 Fed. Reg. 25,204 (1981)
SEC: 44 Fed. Reg. 38,810
44 Fed. Reg. 46,736
44 Fed. Reg. 49,406
44 Fed. Reg. 68,764
44 Fed. Reg. 70,236
45 Fed. Reg. 33,957

58. OCC: September 15, 1981
Corrections to January 22, 1981
issue § 11.5

46 Fed. Reg. 45,747 (1981)
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(July 2, 1979)
(Aug. 8, 1979)
(Aug. 22, 1979)
(Nov. 29, 1979)
(Dec. 6, 1979)
(May 21, 1980)

(July 2, 1979)
(Aug. 8, 1979)
(Aug. 22, 1979)
(Nov. 29, 1979)
(Dec. 6, 1979)
(May 21, 1980)
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TABLE 2 (Continued)
BANK REGULATORY AGENCY
ACTION
59. Fed. January 29, 1982
Correction to February 6, 1981
issue § 206.44

FED. REG. CITATION/SEC
ACTION
(1982)
4230
47 Fed. Reg.

7

60. FDIC, December 14, 1983
Interim financial reporting,
Timely filing of statements,
Reporting effects of changing
prices, Accounting amendments,
Exhibit requirements, Financial statements, technical
§§ 335.103, 335.203, 335.206,
335.212, 335.220, 335.221,
335.309a, 335.312, 335.321,
335.331, 335.358, 335.411,
335.506, 335.508, 335.509,
335.512, 335.604, 335.621

48 Fed. Reg. 35,553 (1983)
SEC: 45 Fed. Reg. 23,651 (Apr. 8, 1980)
45 Fed. Reg. 58,822 (Sep. 5, 1980)
45 Fed. Reg. 63,630 (Sep. 25, 1980)
45 Fed. Reg. 63,660 (Sep. 25, 1980)
45 Fed. Reg. 76,974 (Nov. 21, 1980)
46 Fed. Reg. 11,952 (Feb. 12, 1981)
46 Fed. Reg. 12,480 (Feb. 17, 1981)
46 Fed. Reg. 13,988 (Feb. 25, 1981)
46 Fed. Reg. 19,456 (Mar. 31, 1981)
47 Fed. Reg. 5404 (Feb. 5, 1982)
47 Fed. Reg. 57,679 (Dec. 28, 1982)

61. FDIC: December 23, 1983
Corrections to December 14,
1983 issue

48 Fed. Reg. 56,734 (1983)

62. OCC: October 30, 1985
Complete reformatting and updating of pt. 11

50 Fed. Reg. 45,276 (1985)
SEC: 45 Fed. Reg. 23, 651 (Apr.,8, 1980)
45 Fed. Reg. 58,822 (Sep. 5, 1980)
45 Fed. Reg. 63,630 (Sep. 25, 1980)
45 Fed. Reg. 63,660 (Sep. 25, 1980)
45 Fed. Reg. 63,682 (Sep. 25, 1980)
46 Fed. Reg. 11,952 (Feb. 12, 1981)
46 Fed. Reg. 12,480 (Feb. 17, 1981)
46 Fed. Reg. 19,456 (Mar. 31, 1981
46 Fed. Reg. 56,171 (Nov. 16, 1981)
47 Fed. Reg. 5404 (Feb. 5, 1982)
47 Fed. Reg. 17,046 (Apr. 21, 1982)
47 Fed. Reg. 29,651 (July 8, 1982)
47 Fed. Reg. 29,832 (July 9, 1982)
47 Fed. Reg. 49,963 (Nov. 4, 1982)
47 Fed. Reg. 55,491 (Dec. 10, 1982)
47 Fed. Reg. 55,661 (Dec. 13, 1982)
47 Fed. Reg. 57,679 (Dec. 28, 1982)
48 Fed. Reg. 9520 (Mar. 7, 1983)
48 Fed. Reg. 11,104 (Mar. 16, 1983)
48 Fed. Reg. 35,082 (Aug. 3, 1983)
48 Fed. Reg. 38,218 (Aug. 23, 1983)
48 Fed. Reg. 44,467 (Sep. 29, 1983)
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TABLE 2 (Continued)
BANK REGULATORY AGENCY
ACTION

FED. REG. CITATION/SEC
ACTION

63. OCC: February 10, 1986
Technical amendments to pt. 11,
as reformatted and reorganized
by October 30, 1985 issue

51 Fed. Reg. 4887 (1986)

64. OCC: February 10, 1986
Corrections to October 30, 1985
issue

51 Fed. Reg. 4889 (1986)

65. Fed. December 31, 1987
Rescinding pt. 206 and adding
§ 208.16

52 Fed. Reg. 49,374 (1987)

66. Fed: January 8, 1988
Supplemental notice to December
31, 1987 issue; agency forms
under review

53 Fed. Reg. 492 (1988)

67. OCC: October 28, 1988
Technical amendments to
October 30, 1985 issue

53 Fed. Reg. 43,677 (1988)

68. FDIC: December 29, 1989
Independent audit requirement,
Compensation, Small transaction exemption, Issuer tender
offers, Proxy rules, All holders and best price tender offer rules, Shareholder communications, nonbank companies
financial disclosure in merger
transactions §§ 335.101,
335.201, 335.203, 335.204,
335.206, 335.207, 335.209,
335.210, 335.212, 335.214,
335.220, 335.307, 335.309a,
335.310, 335.312, 335.321,
335.331, 335.332, 335.359,
335.401, 335.402, 335.407335.410, 335.503, 335.507,
335.509-335.510, 335.512,
335.513, 335.521, 335.602,
335.603, 335.610, 335.618,
335.621-335.623, 335.625335.628, 335.701, 335.702

SEC: 47
47
48
48
48
51
51
52

Fed. Reg.
Fed. Reg.
Fed. Reg.
Fed. Reg.
Fed. Reg.
Fed. Reg.
Fed. Reg.
Fr 18,200
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29,652 (July 8, 1982)
55,861 (Dec. 13, 1982)
34,253 (July 28, 1983)
44,467 (Sep. 29, 1983)
46,012 (Oct. 11, 1983)
25,873 (July 17, 1986)
42,048 (Nov. 20, 1986)
(May 8, 1987)
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Notes to Chart 1
1. This chart represents length of time, in months, that the agency took to implement a
final rule substantially similar to an SEC amendment of its 1934 Act regulations ("SEA/SEC
Event"). In each case length of time is rounded to the nearest month and is necessarily an
approximation only.
2. The chart only considers final rules, both for SEC amendments and for corresponding
implementing regulations of the agency.
3. Where data were ambiguous, or where the agency may not have yet acted to implement
a substantially similar rule, no value appears for that SEA/SEC Event.
4. The data are presented on a selective basis only, and generally only for issuance after
the 1974 amendment of section 12(i) required promulgation of final regulations by the agencies "substantially similar" to SEC amendments. (Cf. Table 2, supra.)
5. The "SEA/SEC Events" selected for comparison are SEC issuances identified by the
following key:
Key Issuance Date
Key Issuance Date
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N
O
P
Q
R
S
T

October 6, 1975
February 1978
April 1978
September 7, 1978
July 2, 1979
August 8, 1979
August 22, 1979
November 29, 1979
December 6, 1979
April 8, 1980
May 21, 1980
September 5, 1980
September 25, 1980
September 25, 1980
September 25, 1980
November 25, 1980
February 12, 1981
February 17, 1981
February 25, 1981
March 31, 1981

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol19/iss2/1

U
V
W
X
Y
Z
Al
BI
Cl
D1
El
Fl
GI
HI
II
J1
K1
Li
MI

November 16, 1981
February 5, 1982
April 21, 1982
July 8, 1982
July 9, 1982
November 4, 1982
December 10, 1982
December 13, 1982
December 28, 1982
March 7, 1983
March 16, 1983
July 28, 1983
August 3, 1983
August 23, 1983
September 29, 1983
October 11, 1983
July 17, 1986
November 20, 1986
May 8, 1987
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CHART 1: OCC EXPERIENCE
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CHART 2: FED EXPERIENCE
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[See supra notes accompanying Chart 1.1
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CHART 3: FDIC EXPERIENCE
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[See supra notes accompanying Chart 1.]
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